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Abstract 
Th e voluntary repatriation of refugees and internally 
displaced persons is interpreted as evidence of restored 
security and political stability, improved civil-state rela-
tions, and public confi dence in reconstruction eff orts in 
war-torn countries. Th e fi ndings presented in this article 
indicate that Iraqi refugees’ decision to return is driven less 
by improvements in Iraq than by their desire to rebuild 
their lives back home and overcome the diffi  cult legal 
and socio-economic conditions in neighbouring countries. 
Th e article explores Iraqi returnees’ experiences based on 
accounts of their return and subsequent remigration to 
Syria and Jordan. Th e micro- and macrotransformations 
occurring in post-Saddam Iraq have a strong bearing on 
refugees’ return and reintegration in their home commun-
ities. In the absence of permanent solutions to protracted 
displacement, the Iraqis engage in transnational mobility 
and livelihood strategies and participate in the socio-eco-
nomic developments in home and host countries through 
the constant multidirectional fl ow of economic, social, and 
human capital.
Résumé
Le rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés et des personnes 
déplacées localement est interprété comme un signe de la 
restauration de la sécurité et de la stabilité politique, de 
l’amélioration des relations entre l’état et les citoyens, et 
d’une augmentation de la confi ance dans les eff orts de 
reconstruction des pays déchirés par la guerre. Les résul-
tats présentés dans cet article indiquent que la décision des 
Irakiens de retourner dans leur pays est moins le résultat 
d’une meilleure conjoncture en Irak que de leur désir de 
reconstruire leur vie dans leur pays et de fuir les diffi  cultés 
légales et socio-économiques qu’ils rencontrent dans les 
pays voisins. On y explore les expériences des Irakiens 
qui sont retournés au pays, sur la base des récits de leur 
retour et de leur ré-émigration en Syrie et en Jordanie. Les 
micro- et les macro-transformations ayant lieu dans l’Irak 
d’après Saddam ont en réalité beaucoup de poids sur le 
retour et la réintégration des réfugiés irakiens dans leur 
communauté. En absence de solutions durables aux dépla-
cements prolongés, les Irakiens s’engagent dans la mobilité 
internationale et la recherche de moyens de subsistance, et 
contribuent ainsi au développement socio-économique de 
leur pays et des pays voisins par le fl ux multidirectionnel 
économique, social et humain qu’ils créent.
Introducing Return and Transnational Mobility in 
the Iraqi Displacement Context
Th e voluntary repatriation of refugees and internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) is generally interpreted as evidence of 
progress in a series of post-confl ict issues, including restora-
tion of security and political stability, improvements in civil-
state relations, and public confi dence in reconstruction and 
development goals in war-torn countries.1 In contrast, the 
protracted presence of displaced populations challenges the 
legitimacy of post-confl ict states.2 Th e fi ndings presented in 
this article indicate that Iraqi refugees’ decision to return is 
driven less by improvements in the country of origin than 
by their desire to rebuild their lives back home and to over-
come the diffi  cult socio-economic and legal conditions in 
the countries of fi rst asylum: Syria and Jordan.
Th e persistent lack of political stability and security in 
Iraq not only complicates the repatriation of Iraqi citizens 
but also limits academics’ and practitioners’ ability to inves-
tigate the return experiences of Iraq’s forced migrants. Th is 
article attempts to address this problem by off ering a quali-
tative study of the experiences of externally displaced Iraqis 
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who tried to return and reintegrate into their home societies 
and who, for a host of reasons, have decided to re-migrate 
to Syria and Jordan, the neighbouring countries of refuge. 
Drawing upon the concept of Returnee’s Preparedness and 
Resource Mobilization,3 this article defi nes “return” as an 
act that entails not only a clear and open choice on the part 
of the refugee, but, above all, a proof of readiness supported 
by the gathering of suffi  cient intangible and tangible resour-
ces, indispensable for sustainable reintegration. Iraqis’ will-
ingness to return and their resource-mobilization poten-
tial, as well as their pre- and post-return conditions, aff ect 
their reintegration and their role as agents of social change 
and development at home. On the other hand, the micro- 
and macrotransformations occurring in war-torn Iraq 
have a strong bearing on the success or failure of refugees’ 
repatriations.
Th e Transnational Mobility and Social Networks4 
approach is applied here to explore Iraqis’ cross-border 
mobility and networks, which they have developed as 
alternative livelihood strategies to overcome diffi  cult socio-
economic conditions in the host countries, and the context-
ual factors that led to their remigration. Refugees’ potential 
role as agents for socio-political and economic development 
is not solely related to their permanent return. Th e Iraqi 
migrants contribute to rebuilding the economic infrastruc-
ture and the socio-political fabric of their home country by 
exposing sending and receiving areas to a constant multi-
directional fl ow of economic and social remittances.5 Th e 
home and host governments and the international refugee 
regime have acknowledged the importance of Iraqis’ spon-
taneous cross-border movements and networks. However, 
they have yet to incorporate them into context-specifi c 
return and reintegration assistance policies that maxi-
mize the role of returnees and members of the receiving 
communities as key agents in the national reconstruction 
process.
Research Methods and Participants
Th is study is based on fi rst-hand interviews with Iraqi refu-
gees conducted during a period of fi eld research in Syria and 
Jordan between January 2010 and March 2011. Th e discus-
sion is mainly based on Iraqis’ accounts of their repatriation 
and their subsequent remigration. Th e experiences of Iraqi 
refugees were observed within the transnational social fi elds 
in which they are embedded. Transnational social fi elds are 
defi ned as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social 
relationships through which ideas, information, goods, 
practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organ-
ized, and transformed.6 Conceptualizing Iraqis’ livelihoods 
as taking place within transnational social fi elds allows the 
analysis to expand beyond the refugees in neighbouring 
countries to those who stayed behind but are connected to 
them through the networks of social relations, established 
and sustained across borders. Semi-structured interviews 
have been conducted with 14 respondents, 7 in Damascus 
and 7 in Amman. Th e interviewees have been recruited 
through a snowballing system: the researcher met partici-
pants through friends, colleagues and the UN agencies and 
NGOs where she worked as a volunteer both in Syria and 
Jordan. All interviews were conducted in standard Arabic, 
recorded and translated into English, with the essential sup-
port of Arabic-speaking assistants. Th e sample of partici-
pants includes Iraqi individuals and families who:
1. fl ed Iraq aft er 2003,
2. are or are not registered with the UNHCR and sought 
or did not seek resettlement to a third country of 
asylum, 
3. have adopted transnational livelihood strategies,
4. come from any ethno-religious, educational or socio-
economic background,
5. have resided (legally or illegally) in the host country 
for at least six months, and
6. have returned to any area of Iraq.
Th e 14 respondents fl ed between 2003 and 2009, follow-
ing the US-led invasion and the consecutive escalation of 
ethno-sectarian violence across the country. Before fl ight, 
11 participants resided in diff erent areas of Baghdad; one in 
Al-Falluja, Al-Anbar; one in Al-Emara, Misan; one in the 
city of Basra. Th eir length of stay abroad varied from six 
months to over three years. In Damascus research partici-
pants were six men, aged between 25 and 68, and a 64-year-
old woman. Th eir level of education varied: fi ve male par-
ticipants hold university degrees or diplomas, the female 
participant has a secondary school degree, and the 25-year-
old interviewee left  Iraq before completing his high school 
education. In Iraq the female participant was a housewife 
and the rest of the male participants, with the exception 
of the student, worked as salaried professionals in schools, 
universities, and government ministries.
In Amman, respondents were fi ve men, aged between 22 
and 63; and two women, aged 30 and 44 years. Th e fi ve male 
participants hold university degrees and the two female 
participants obtained high school diplomas. In Iraq, one 
of the female participants ran a beauty salon and the other 
was unemployed; three male participants worked in univer-
sities, another male participant owned a supermarket, and 
the 22-year-old participant was a student. Despite the high 
educational level among the Iraqis interviewed in Syria and 
Jordan, only two managed to fi nd regular work opportun-
ities in the host countries, owing to diffi  culties to obtain 
work permits. Th eir well-being depends on transnational 
kinship ties and other social networks of solidarity and 
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fi nancial support, international organizations’ cash and in-
kind assistance, informal work in the local labour market, 
and migrants’ engagement in cross-border income-gener-
ating activities between Iraq and the countries of refuge. 
Mason7 correctly highlights how Iraqi refugees’ socio-eco-
nomic circumstances determine their ability to secure legal 
status and consequently enhance their physical mobility. 
Th e inability to freely move across borders reduces migrants’ 
access to resources and opportunities available in Iraq and 
in other countries, thereby impeding their socio-economic 
betterment.
Th e asylum and immigration status of respondents is 
therefore a key factor infl uencing their living conditions 
in exile and their decisions about return. Before repatria-
tion, fi ve participants interviewed in Jordan held an annual 
residence permit and two had overstayed. Only three of 
these participants had sought refugee status through the 
UNHCR. In Syria, all participants held a temporary resi-
dence permit, allowing them to travel between the home 
and the host country. All interviewees met in Damascus 
were registered with the UNHCR and sought resettlement 
to a third country of refuge. Holding a valid residence per-
mit was a precautionary measure that allowed them to visit 
Iraq and re-enter Syria and Jordan at any time, without 
facing immigration restrictions.
Participants’ decision-making processes about return 
also depended on the religion, socio-cultural values, and 
gendered power relations in the Iraqi families and com-
munities. With the exception of the female participant 
from a Christian Chaldean background, the remaining 
respondents interviewed in Damascus and Amman are 
Arab Muslims. In Jordan, fi ve respondents are Shiites and 
two are Sunnites. In Syria one participant is Shiite, three are 
Sunnites, and the other three Muslim participants refused 
to disclose their sectarian affi  liation, asserting their Iraqi 
identity and expressing strong disapproval of the ethno-
sectarian identity politics causing divisions and violence 
in their home societies. Th e migratory trajectories of refu-
gees’ return and their reintegration experiences have been 
aff ected by the phenomenon of ethnically-based territorial 
and administrative polarization that has forced some par-
ticipants to abandon their houses and jobs and move from 
religious and ethnically mixed areas to homogeneous ones 
in search of safe havens. Among the female participants 
only one embarked on the migration and return process 
unaccompanied. Th e remaining female participants went 
back with their families and were interviewed in the pres-
ence of their husbands, who, conforming to Iraqi socio-
cultural customs, tended to lead the interview and speak 
about the return experience on behalf of the whole family. 
Th is may have reduced the women’s freedom to express their 
opinions and discuss their personal experiences in greater 
depth.
Th e fi ndings presented below are not representative of 
the entire Iraqi refugee populations in Syria and Jordan or 
generalizable to other displacement crises. A more compre-
hensive study of Iraqis’ migration experiences and future 
trends would need a larger sample and greater operational 
support in the data collection. Th is article, however, contrib-
utes to understanding the complex individual and societal 
dynamics involved in refugee returns by off ering a qualita-
tive analysis of the variety of Iraqi returnees’ profi les and 
experiences. It illustrates how under specifi c circumstances, 
Iraqi refugees’ transnational livelihoods and social net-
works have emerged as spontaneous survival mechanisms 
and opportunities to participate in the economic and socio-
political developments in Iraq and in their host countries.
Desire to Return and Lack of Alternatives
Th e decision to return to areas aff ected by insecurity and by 
lack of infrastructure and public services is extremely dif-
fi cult. Within the limits of available information, legal and 
socio-economic uncertainty, and constraints in host and 
home countries, Iraqi refugees evaluate their human condi-
tions and life circumstances and take critical decisions about 
their future. Th e participants in this study expressed diff er-
ing degrees of willingness to return, but, given the absence 
of security and rule of law in their country, all shared the 
apprehension that by going back they were exposing them-
selves to the risk of abuse and violence.
Some participants have fl ed, alone or with their fam-
ilies, in order to avert becoming victims of the armed con-
fl ict and the economic depression associated with it. Th eir 
initial intention was to fi nd temporary shelter in neighbour-
ing countries until the situation at home improved and they 
could return and resume their “normal” lives. Th eir lack of 
interest in permanent resettlement in a third country and 
their greater willingness to return is driven by the lack of 
family ties abroad. For them, the resettlement experience 
entails more compromises and losses than advantages: it 
takes immense courage to travel far from the homeland 
and rebuild lives from scratch in a diff erent society where 
migrants are likely to face communication barriers, eco-
nomic hardships, and socio-cultural integration problems. 
Th e high costs and challenges of living in a foreign society 
combine with migrants’ strong desire to reunite with the 
families and friends whom they have left  behind, recoup 
their lost rights and properties, and resume their pre-war 
activities in their home communities.
Other participants have left  Iraq aft er being targets of 
persecution or violence, or witnesses of killings, kidnap-
pings, and forced removal of family members. Th ey attribute 
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the gross human rights violations they have suff ered to the 
operations launched by the US-led military forces and the 
subsequent escalation of politically incited ethno-sectarian 
violence. Th e physical abuses they have endured left  them 
with irreversible physical damage, severe burns, disfi gure-
ment, scarring, and broken bones. Physical disabilities are 
aggravated by traumas derived from the tragic loss of loved 
ones, their houses, land, properties, and jobs. For these refu-
gees return is not a matter of “free choice” but more a reac-
tion to the lack of alternatives. Th e precarious legal status 
and means of subsistence in neighbouring countries of asy-
lum, combined with the scarce opportunities for resettle-
ment in the West, have led them to consider return as the 
only available option.8
Th e lack of progress in resettlement applications is a 
critical factor in Iraqis’ decisions about return. Th e reluc-
tance of third-party governments in the West to resettle high 
numbers of refugees, combined with the limited resources 
and operational capacity of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to deal with a substantial amount 
of resettlement applications, has led to backlogs in the allo-
cation of resettlement places.9 In Syria, a number of par-
ticipants have expressed disappointment and frustration at 
the UNHCR’s delay in examining their refugee fi les, many 
of which have been pending for over three years. Th e long 
hours spent outside of UNHCR offi  ces, queuing to listen 
to an overworked UN employee saying “come back in six 
months, your case is still under scrutiny,” crushes their 
hopes and leaves the migrants in a wearing state of uncer-
tainty about the future. Some have made the decision to go 
back, overwhelmed by the psychologically and physically 
challenging living conditions in exile.
In Syria and Jordan, most Iraqis feel trapped in legal 
and physical limbo. Th e Syrian Arab Republic and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have not ratifi ed the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Iraqis 
are not granted refugee status and are hosted as “tempor-
ary guests.” Th eir presence is regulated through temporary 
residence permits, subject to frequent changes depending 
on regional and internal politico-economic developments 
and Syria’s and Jordan’s relations with the Iraqi government 
and international donors. In late 2006 Jordan imposed visa 
restrictions on Iraqi nationals as a result of an increasing 
fear of a spillover of the sectarian and anti-occupation vio-
lence raging in neighbouring Iraq. Syria’s imposition of visa 
requirements on Iraqi refugees in 2007 was less driven by 
national security concerns than by an attempt by the regime 
to pressure the US and the Iraqi governments to share the 
fi nancial burden of the refugee crisis.10
Th e protracted presence of a large number of Iraqi 
migrants in the two host countries has exerted signifi cant 
pressures on national infrastructure, water supplies, pub-
lic services, and housing. Th e UNHCR has launched sev-
eral appeals for fi nancial support from developed countries, 
especially the states directly involved in the 2003 US-led 
invasion, to assist the Syrian and Jordanian governments to 
meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi refugees. International 
fi nancial assistance for the Iraqi refugees hosted in the near 
abroad has materialized unevenly; Jordan received nearly 
twice as much as Syria and 1.4 times as much as Lebanon.11 
Th e Syrian and Jordanian governments, already struggling 
to provide basic services and opportunities for their own 
citizens, have therefore adopted a series of selective policies 
that discourage Iraqi migrants from integrating perma-
nently into the host societies.
Such policies are driven by host countries’ security con-
cerns and calculations of the long-term impact of migrants’ 
presence and cross-border activities on host countries’ 
socio-economic development. Th e relationship of inter-
dependence between the three neighbouring countries 
is confi rmed by historical bilateral trade and investment 
agreements in the energy, transit routes, and transportation 
sectors.12 For Syria and Jordan, hosting Iraqi transnational 
migrants, especially wealthy and powerful Iraqi politicians, 
businessmen, and merchant families, who have controlled 
Iraq’s agricultural and industrial sectors for the past century, 
guarantees continued profi table transactions with Iraq. Van 
Hear has emphasized that involuntary population infl uxes 
can bring great benefi ts to receiving societies in terms of 
acquisition of human, social, and economic capital needed 
for local development.13 Yet these potential benefi ts depend 
upon the existence of a propitious normative environment 
in the host countries that maximizes the positive impact of 
migrant capital infl ux.
In Jordan, Iraqis have to meet stringent requirements 
such as possessing major in-country investments or cur-
rency deposits in local banks to obtain annual residence 
permits. With the exception of wealthy investors and highly 
skilled migrants employed in the Jordanian private sector, 
Iraqi people cannot secure long-term residency and work 
permits. Th ose who cannot aff ord the costs involved in 
attaining residency overstay their visas and reside irregu-
larly in Jordan. Th ey are subject to accumulative fi nes and, 
because of their irregular status, they cannot travel abroad 
or pay temporary visits to Iraq. Th e inability to move across 
borders reduces migrants’ access to resources and oppor-
tunities available in Iraq or in other countries, thereby 
causing their socio-economic immobility and downward 
assimilation in host societies. Since 2008, the Jordanian 
authorities have granted a number of amnesties to irregular 
Iraqi residents including the reduction of accumulated fi nes 
by 50 percent for those who wish to remain in the country 
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and waiving fi nes for those who wish to return home. It has 
been reported that these initiatives have been ineff ective in 
augmenting the number of Iraqi returnees14 but there are 
no accurate and independent statistics to verify this claim. 
Other sources suggest that the unstable security situation 
at home discourages the Iraqi people’s permanent return 
and there is a widespread perception that once they leave it 
would be extremely diffi  cult to re-enter Jordan.15
Th e Syrian authorities, in contrast, have granted annual 
residence permits to members of the Iraqi Ba’ath party, 
traders, businessmen, families with children enrolled in 
local schools, and highly skilled Iraqis employed in the local 
labour market. Th ose who do not belong to these categories 
possess a permit of stay on humanitarian grounds, valid for 
three months and renewable, at no cost, at the Immigration 
and Passports Department. In Syria, as in Jordan, the lack 
of regular employment and the high costs of investment 
and higher education opportunities discourage Iraqi fam-
ilies’ permanent integration in the host society. Syrian 
immigration and residency policies towards the Iraqi forced 
migrants may refl ect strategic economic speculations, pol-
itical calculations against US and international pressures 
and sanctions, attachment to international fi nancial assist-
ance in a period of economic crisis, and ambitions to deepen 
political infl uence and trade relations with Iraq.16 Syria’s 
fl exible immigration and residency rules are nevertheless 
facilitating Iraqis’ circular movements, their transnational 
livelihood strategies, their decisions and preparation for 
return. In contrast, Jordan’s more selective regulations 
have induced many Iraqi migrants into illegality and con-
sequently prevented them from embarking on cross-border 
movements and activities. Restrictions on Iraqis’ freedom 
of movement across borders hamper their ability to person-
ally assess the situation at home, take decisions, and prepare 
their sustainable return.17
Th e Preparedness of Iraqi Returnees
Cassarino18 introduces the concept of Returnees’ 
Preparedness which refers to return as a voluntary act that 
must be supported by the gathering of suffi  cient intangible 
and tangible resources to facilitate the sustainable post-
return reintegration experience. Th e gathering and mobil-
ization of resources prior to repatriation requires time and 
depends on a number of interconnected variables: migrants’ 
pre-fl ight circumstances, their living conditions in the host 
countries, and the available information about return and 
reintegration challenges and opportunities.
Information about socio-political and economic develop-
ments in the areas of return plays a key role in shaping Iraqis’ 
expectations about home and infl uencing their decision-
making processes. All the participants in this study obtain 
information from Iraqi satellite TV channels, phone calls 
and email exchanges with family and friends in Iraq, visits 
to and from home areas, and word-of-mouth communica-
tions among the Iraqi people living or transiting in the host 
countries. Th e Iraqi participants fi lter the information dis-
seminated by the media and institutional sources since it is 
perceived as manipulated by competing political forces. Th e 
inability of international humanitarian agencies to provide 
accurate and reliable advice to potential returnees derives 
from their limited presence and operational capacity in the 
areas of origin.19
In the absence of reliable institutional sources, the par-
ticipants trust information generated by themselves or by 
trustworthy informal sources, who produce news oriented 
towards their own personal concerns.20 Refugees’ decision-
making processes are strongly infl uenced by the available 
information about conditions in home areas, how it is circu-
lated amongst them, and how they subjectively evaluate and 
react to it.21 Th e information acquired through these social 
networks contributes to raising refugees’ expectations about 
their post-return experience.22 In some cases, refugees 
have realized only upon their return that the information 
obtained by informal sources is less accurate or objective 
than they expected. Th e respondents who have not vis-
ited Iraq before their repatriation claimed that it is impos-
sible to gather suffi  cient and accurate information about 
transformations that have occurred at home during their 
absence. Th ey feel ill-prepared to plan their return a priori; 
they need to personally assess the situation at home. Th e 
forced migrants who have adopted cross-border livelihood 
strategies have the opportunity to assess the local realities at 
home and weigh the costs and benefi ts of repatriation. Some 
participants personally witnessed the lack of improvements 
in their home areas and had low prospects concerning their 
return experience. Nonetheless, the unsustainable way of 
life and the lack of stability and future prospects in the host 
societies had a greater impact on their decision to return 
than their concerns about the insecurity and political vola-
tility at home.
Th e personalized information received by Iraqi migrants 
is only one critical factor infl uencing their plans and 
resource mobilization before repatriation. Migrants’ pre-
fl ight circumstances and living conditions in host countries 
also aff ect their ability to prepare for return. Before fl ight, 
some participants were targets of military operations or 
ethno-sectarian violence. Th ey were severely injured and 
lost their loved ones, their houses and jobs. Th ey arrived 
in the host countries to seek assistance from humanitarian 
organizations that provide costly and specialized medical 
care, unavailable in Iraq. Given the losses they have suff ered 
and their struggle to survive in the host countries, they 
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have limited potential and independent means to mobilize 
resources prior to repatriation. Th e emotional and material 
losses they endured are inestimable and they have received 
no compensation for the harms suff ered. Th e sustainable 
return and reintegration of these migrants requires pro-
active institutional intervention in the form of eff ective rep-
aration schemes that include not only fi nancial and material 
compensation for damaged and expropriated properties, 
but also the provision of adequate physical and mental 
health services and specifi c rehabilitation programs that 
off er education and employment opportunities to people 
with special needs.
Other respondents have not experienced the same degree 
of violence, destruction, and deprivation before fl ight. Yet 
their stay in the host countries is similarly characterized by 
legal precariousness, lack of employment, and scarce oppor-
tunities for socio-economic advancement. In such circum-
stances, the mobilization of fi nancial and material resour-
ces is extremely limited and the migrants rely on available 
resources at home in order to return and reintegrate. Th eir 
well-being depends on money transfers from Iraq and other 
countries, services subsidized by the host governments, 
assistance from humanitarian organizations, and casual 
jobs in the local informal market. In the absence of regular 
income-generating opportunities in the host societies some 
refugees have decided to take the risk and return to Iraq, 
with the expectation to fi nd or resume their old professions 
and earn wages substantially higher than in neighbouring 
Syria and Jordan. Post-Saddam Iraq is in a period of high 
political uncertainty and slow economic growth. In 2008, 
the Iraqi government granted a large wage increase in the 
public sector to compensate for the erosion of real wages 
that had occurred during previous years.23 Since mid-2009, 
oil export earnings have returned to pre-2003 levels and 
government revenues have recovered and are increasing, 
along with global oil prices.24 Attracted by the news of eco-
nomic progress, the Iraqi migrants decide to return, despite 
the diffi  cult security and political circumstances, to earn 
higher incomes to support their families.
Wealthier and more educated Iraqi families depend on 
income generated through salaries or state pensions, family 
businesses, and the income from rents and sales of proper-
ties and land in Iraq. Th e fl ow of signifi cant fi nancial capital 
from Iraq allows them to optimize their forced migration 
experience and turn it into an opportunity to develop and 
diversify their skills. In Jordan, for instance, some partici-
pants have enrolled in higher education programs in local 
private universities and can aff ord covering their families’ 
living expenses in the host country for the entire duration 
of their studies. As long as they are registered students, they 
are entitled to annual residency permits, granting them 
freedom to travel to Iraq and to other countries and to 
engage in cross-border business and other activities. Th e 
Iraqis with university degrees and several years of work 
experience have found a remedy to the lack of employ-
ment opportunities in the host countries by working online 
from home. Some others actively engage in human rights 
advocacy, fund-raising campaigns, training sessions, and 
consultancy work, at times in the form of private fi rms, at 
others in coordination and partnership with national and 
international humanitarian organizations, whose fi eld 
offi  ces are staff ed with paid Iraqi volunteers.25 Working 
in such a dynamic and multicultural environment enables 
them to cultivate social remittances that they invest to pro-
mote social change in both sending and receiving countries. 
Social remittances include enriched individual and collect-
ive identities, new ideas, values, behaviours, forms of know-
ledge, and attitudes towards democracy, human rights, and 
social justice.26 Th ese participants use the material resour-
ces at their disposal not only to ensure a safe shelter and the 
fulfi llment of their basic needs but also to acquire qualifi -
cations, new skills, and values that they plan to employ to 
participate in the reconstruction of the economic and social 
fabric of their country.
In favourable post-return environments, returnees’ per-
sonal aspirations and their educational and professional 
advancement may facilitate their reintegration process, 
their upward social mobility, and their innovative role in 
their home communities. Some participants have gained 
consistent fi nancial capital, remittances, transnational 
business, and social networks which, supported by appos-
ite and well-developed commercial laws, could become the 
basis for new investments and boost the creation of employ-
ment opportunities and economic development in Iraq.27 
However, the capacity of returnees to invest their assets, 
skills, and experiences and bring about changes has been 
aff ected by the profound socio-political and environmental 
transformations in the home country. Th ey have had to 
interact with a new socio-political order in the societies of 
origin. Adapting to the changing circumstances at home 
sometimes entailed tough compromises, even forsaking 
the skills, values, and identities acquired abroad. Th ose 
who could not achieve a satisfactory adjustment with the 
changing conditions at home faced integration challenges 
and problems and eventually opted for remigration.28
Attempting Return and Re-migration from Iraq
Aft er living in the safety of neighbouring Syria and Jordan 
for a prolonged period of time, some participants have had 
diffi  culties in adapting to the unsafe and poor living con-
ditions in war-torn home areas. Upon return, participants’ 
nostalgic memories of Iraq’s beautiful cities and natural 
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landscapes have been replaced by images of destruction 
and dilapidation of historic streets, buildings, and national 
heritage sites with few visible signs of reconstruction. Some 
participants described areas of return as “enormous piles 
of dust and dirt,” where high concrete walls and numerous 
checkpoints hamper people’s freedom of movement, divide 
cities into homogeneous ethno-sectarian areas, and create 
an atmosphere of fear and suspicion among former neigh-
bours. For some participants, physical reintegration was an 
exhausting and frustrating process given the unreliable pro-
vision of electricity, health care facilities, and other essen-
tial public services. Th ey could not bear the general lack of 
security and the harsh climate and living conditions in their 
home country. Aft er the end of the “liberation” war, the US 
Coalition Provisional Authority and the following Iraqi 
governments disappointed the expectations of Iraqi cit-
izens by neglecting their claim for the right to human rather 
than military security.29 Iraq’s transitional period has been 
characterized by uneven distribution of national resources, 
socio-economic inequalities, high levels of unemployment 
and destitution, and a lack of legal protection. Th ese fac-
tors caused widespread popular discontent and a growing 
involvement of Iraqis in conservative religious groups and 
insurgent movements, which took up the role of alternative 
guarantors of physical and human security.30
Some participants went back to their areas of residence 
before fl ight where they own a house, which has not been 
damaged, expropriated, or occupied by others. Th ey were 
not afraid of their neighbours; they feared the violence 
resulting from the power struggle between political parties 
and their respective militia groups. Others were not able 
to return to their home areas because their properties have 
been destroyed or occupied in the course of the episodes 
of ethno-sectarian cleansing that occurred during the last 
confl ict. Th e Iraqi mosaic of ethno-religious groups have 
co-existed in relative peace for centuries and Iraqi families 
and tribal confederations are the product of inter-ethnic 
and inter-sectarian marriages.31 Th e pre-1963 Iraqi nation-
alist movements were cross-ethnic in nature and prioritized 
domestic development over membership in a supranational 
Pan-Arab entity. Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958–
1963) was the main promoter of a form of inclusive and 
pluralist Iraqi nationalism. Th e succeeding Ba’ath regimes 
endorsed instead a Pan-Arab unity discourse emphasizing 
a xenophobic and chauvinist interpretation of Arabism that 
promoted Sunni Arab domination of Iraqi politics and soci-
ety, repressing Kurdish and Shiite claims to ethno-sectar-
ian self-determination.32 Qasim Hussein Saleh33 explains 
that under Saddam Hussein (1968–2003) the Ba’ath regime 
indoctrinated the people to believe that the Iraqi nation 
was equivalent to the president or that being loyal to Iraq 
meant being loyal to Saddam. For over three decades the 
Iraqi people were exposed to this equation through the 
state-controlled media outlets, its educational institutions, 
and its party cadres. When in 2003 the dictator fell and 
hid in a hole under the ground, Iraqis’ feelings of loyalty 
disappeared with him. Aft er the “big tent” of the state col-
lapsed and law and order turned into chaos, panic spread 
among the people who divided and sought protection from 
families, tribes, clans, religious authorities, civil groups, 
political parties, and any other force or power that could 
shelter them. Th e feeling of belonging to the Iraqi nation 
was suspended and replaced by innumerable loyalties that 
started competing to achieve a place of authority in the new 
political power structure. Th e US Coalition Provisional 
Authority and the subsequent Iraqi governments enforced 
constitutional laws and policies such as the 2005 electoral 
law, the de-Ba’athifi cation order, and the dissolution of the 
Iraqi national army that reinforced ethno-sectarian div-
isions and led to the territorial polarization of previously 
religious and ethnically mixed areas and communities.34 
Th e Iraqi society is now struggling to escape a trap set up by 
foreign powers, local parties, and religious leaders through 
the political manipulation of ethnic and religious feelings.
For some respondents the relationships with family 
members and friends who stayed behind has changed along 
with the surrounding environment. Th e time spent shel-
tered in the host countries has off ered the forced migrants 
room to recover from the traumas of the confl ict, regain 
health, learn new things, and look forward to a more hope-
ful and peaceful future. In contrast, they have depicted their 
relatives and friends who remained in Iraq during and aft er 
the war as “fearful,” “worried,” “stressed,” and prone to 
suspicious and aggressive behaviours as a response to the 
multitude of dangers and the depriving living conditions. 
During the Ba’ath era, there was a single centre of power 
and social control and Iraqis could recognize and thereby 
avoid the sources of threats. In contrast, aft er the fall of the 
regime, they feel they can no longer guarantee their safety, 
since they are exposed to unknown perils from several 
sides. Th e US military troops, foreign terrorists, and the 
various political and religious parties ruling the country 
are ready to use arbitrary force to impose their power and 
control over national resources. One of the alleged goals of 
the US-led invasion was to bring democracy and freedom 
of expression to the Iraqi people. Almost nine years since 
the end of military operations in Iraq, these objectives have 
evidently not been achieved. Th e US disengagement strat-
egy has progressively left  the country in the hands of con-
servative religious authorities and political parties, which 
repress citizens’ freedom of expression and have commit-
ted gross human rights violations, including the arrest and 
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detention of thousands of civilians without charge and fair 
trials.35 Some participants in this study have remigrated 
aft er being subjected to abuses of power committed by the 
very authorities that were supposed to protect them. One 
of the returnees owned a supermarket in Baghdad and 
the local police harassed him and the other shop owners 
in the area and extorted bribes in exchange for protec-
tion. He made the brave decision to report the injustices 
he was enduring to the governorate authorities. As a result, 
his shop was destroyed, and he was physically assaulted by 
security offi  cers and had to escape again from Iraq to pro-
tect his family.
Some participants faced diffi  culties interacting with other 
members of their home communities, which, during their 
absence, had become increasingly religious and conserva-
tive. Aft er more than four decades of largely secular Ba’athist 
rule, radical factions in Iraq’s Sunnite and Shiite commun-
ities have asserted political control over society, leading to 
the prevalence of conservative religious values and habits 
such as pressures on women, including Christians, to wear 
the veil. One of the female returnees was forced out of Iraq 
for the second time aft er renewed death threats by a group 
of unknown armed men, who, the previous year, attacked 
her because she ran a Haram (forbidden) beauty salon. Th e 
assaulters brutally beat her and threw sulphuric acid at her 
face, causing disfi gurement and the loss of one eye. Th e 
perpetrators of this horrible act remain at large; the police 
never opened an investigation into this violent crime.
Other returnees felt neglected by the new Iraqi govern-
ment, which adopted a series of policies and measures that 
promoted social inequalities and discrimination rather 
than national reconciliation and rehabilitation. One of this 
study’s participants returned with his family to Baghdad to 
reclaim his house, which had been expropriated by mem-
bers of the new Iraqi National Guard. He was forced to go 
back to Syria aft er his failed attempt to seek justice and the 
restitution of his property. While victims of the former 
regime have access to mechanisms for land and property 
rights compensation,36 Iraqi victims of land and property 
rights violations aft er 2003 have no other option but to seek 
justice through the ordinary Iraqi court system. Th ey have 
to go back and fi le a reclaim with no guarantee of being 
compensated for the harms suff ered. Despite the great need 
for protection and compensation for their losses, the lack 
of confi dence and mistrust towards public authorities pre-
vents returnee families from registering with the Ministry 
of Migration and Displacement for reintegration assistance. 
Afraid of being identifi ed and located by potentially danger-
ous agents, many returnees avoid state authorities altogether. 
Th is type of return and reintegration assistance favours one 
group over another and is likely to have a negative impact in 
terms of national reconciliation and peace building since it 
may sow the seeds for future strife.
Th e situation of one of this study’s participants sub-
ject to the Accountability and Justice Law was even more 
sensitive. He felt he was victim of a grave injustice; the de-
Ba’athifi cation regulations were applied to his case based not 
on evidence of his individual responsibility but rather on 
the assumption that being a Ba’ath party member he shared 
the responsibility for the crimes of the previous regime. As 
a result, his properties were confi scated, he was forced out 
of employment, lost his pension rights, and upon return 
he was again exposed to threats and retribution from ele-
ments of the Bader Organization linked to the Shiite Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Th e government has used 
the Accountability and Justice Law as a weapon of collective 
punishment and a means to eliminate potential agents of 
dissent or opposition to the newly established political order 
in Iraq.37
Some returnees gave up their rights to social welfare and 
services from state institutions in order to preserve their 
dignity and avoid the frustration of dealing with the disor-
ganized and corrupted Iraqi bureaucratic system. In order 
to obtain support from local authorities some respondents 
had to pay bribes or use their wastas or personal recommen-
dations and connections with the sectarian political groups, 
which controlled the various ministries and public offi  ces. 
Th e system of patronage and widespread corruption has 
developed and rapidly proliferated since the 1990s, in reac-
tion to the protracted wars and the devastating eff ects of the 
13 years of UN economic sanctions against Iraq, when state 
employees received salaries as low as two dollars per month 
and depended on bribes to sustain their families. Obtaining 
job opportunities and access to welfare and social protec-
tion schemes did not depend on individual needs, qualifi -
cations, and skills but on the right connections and affi  lia-
tions.38 Indeed, the change of regime has not brought 
improvements in this sense. Before, Iraqi people had to 
be members of one single institution, the Ba’ath party, in 
order to ensure employment and socio-economic mobility. 
Now the new ethno-sectarian political order has reshaped 
the system of patronage into multiple channels of political 
loyalism that hamper people’s rights to equal opportun-
ities. Th is situation has led one of the interviewees to claim: 
“Today, corruption is the only institution that can be called 
national in Iraq; it involves Iraqis from all ethno-sectarian 
backgrounds and there is coordination between them.”
Th ese institutionalized practices prevent the socio-eco-
nomic reintegration of those who are qualifi ed for certain 
positions but do not wish to be associated with any reli-
gious or political group and refuse to be part of this sys-
tem of ethno-sectarian discrimination. Th e participants 
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who returned with the intention to actively contribute their 
knowledge and skills to the national reconciliation dialogue 
and the reconstruction process have been prevented by the 
prevailing system and by new threats of persecution and 
violence. One of the respondents holds a PhD in political 
sciences and returned to work in a university in Baghdad. 
During a conference on the role of religious parties in 
national politics he made a contribution for which he was 
assaulted by the outraged audience. Aft er this episode, he 
had to leave the country and his job again and resettled with 
his family in Jordan. Th is experience convinced him that 
the Iraqi society is not yet ready to off er him an open and 
democratic work environment, where he can freely express 
his opinion without fear of subsequent retaliation.
What Happens aft er Re-migration?
Under the above mentioned circumstances, these 
Iraqi migrants’ attempts to return were unsurprisingly 
unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the failed return experiences 
produced diverse reactions among the research participants. 
Th e abortive returns made some lose hope of ever re-estab-
lishing their lives back home and have spurred them on to 
seek onward migration opportunities and an alternative 
“home” in a Western country, where they hope to achieve 
personal security, stability, and a better future. Aft er remi-
gration they have resettled temporarily in the neighbouring 
countries, where they check the progress of their asylum 
applications with the UNHCR. Some of the respondents 
employed in Iraqi institutions resigned from their posts, 
having decided not to return to their old jobs or found more 
attractive employment opportunities in the host countries’ 
private sector. Th ey have sold their properties in Iraq and 
invested the money from the sales in houses and businesses 
in Jordan and Syria. One participant bought two apartments 
in Amman and has started a car import-export business in 
collaboration with a network of Iraqi partners based in the 
US, Jordan, and Iraq. Taking advantage of Jordan’s invest-
ment promotion laws, the group of investors purchase new 
cars from the US via the Internet and import them to the 
Iraqi market through Jordan. Despite their desire to settle 
permanently in their fi rst countries of asylum and the eco-
nomic opportunity to do so, the legal and living conditions 
of Iraqi families in Jordan and Syria are as uncertain as 
the renewal of their temporary residency permits. Without 
being granted a longer-term residency status, investing in 
future projects in the host countries is a hazardous under-
taking. Th e precarious migration status induces the Iraqi 
families to seek resettlement opportunities in a third coun-
try, where they hope to achieve full citizenship rights and 
long-term integration opportunities.
On the other hand, the challenging post-return experi-
ences in the home areas have not dissuaded some other par-
ticipants from returning to Iraq. Aft er unsuccessfully seek-
ing compensation for the physical, emotional, and material 
losses suff ered, some participants have re-migrated to Syria 
and Jordan. However, they keep going back and forth in 
order to collect assistance from family and friends in Iraq 
and assess developments at home. Th ey plan a new attempt 
to return when the situation stabilizes and the Iraqi govern-
ment enforces the laws and measures necessary to facilitate 
their safe and dignifi ed repatriation. One participant lives 
and works in Iraq for roughly two months and then goes 
back to Damascus to visit his family and bring them the 
money he earns. Several months aft er his return to Iraq, 
another interviewee moved back to Jordan, where he has 
been off ered a PhD place in a Jordanian private univer-
sity. His wife and children have permanently resettled in 
Iraq, where they enjoy the protection and support of their 
extended families and tribe. Every three months he vis-
its them in Iraq and upon the completion of his doctoral 
studies he plans to join his family and fi nd work in an Iraqi 
university. His aspiration is to use the postgraduate qualifi -
cation and skills he is acquiring in Jordan to contribute to 
the nation-building process in his country. Th e former civil 
servant subjected to the Accountability and Justice Law has 
found employment in Erbil, in the Kurdistan autonomous 
region in the north of Iraq,39 where he took up a teaching 
position in a private university. He has embarked on the 
migration experience alone, while his wife and children 
have remained in Damascus. Th ese coping mechanisms 
include refugees’ transnational lives, circular migration, 
and cross-border activities as a livelihood strategy. Nyborg 
Sørensen40 identifi ed two typologies of mobile livelihoods, 
namely “staggered repatriation” and “revolving returnees.” 
Th e former includes fragmented families, with one or two 
members, usually male, returning to the home country in 
search of socio-economic opportunities, while women and 
school-age children remain in the country of asylum. Such 
livelihood strategy is perceived by the migrants as a safety 
net, since it allows them to reduce the economic and secur-
ity risks of return. Revolving returnees are instead migrants 
who plan to return permanently but are forced to re-migrate 
for economic and security reasons, or due to their failure 
to reunite with the other members of their families in the 
country of origin. Th e information that migrants acquire 
during their periodic repatriation and the experiences and 
obstacles they face have a strong impact on their decisions 
and plans to return permanently.
Before repatriation most respondents do not close their 
refugee fi le with the UNHCR since they are uncertain about 
the security situation at home. In this way, they can go back 
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and personally assess conditions in return areas without 
losing their prima facie refugee status41 and the related 
assistance that they receive in the countries of fi rst asy-
lum. Another precautionary measure adopted by most par-
ticipants, registered or not with the UNHCR, is renewing 
their residency permits in the host countries before their 
departure to Iraq. Holding a valid residency permit allows 
them to move freely between the home and host countries, 
without facing immigration restrictions and without being 
charged expensive entry-visa fees.
Th e UNHCR has reported these spontaneous cross-bor-
der movements: “[R]ecent increases in no-show rates for 
food and cash assistance may be an indicator that signifi -
cant numbers of Iraqis are traveling back and forth to Iraq 
without deregistering from UNHCR.”42 Th e agency did not 
organize ‘go and see visits’ since a growing number of refu-
gees arrange visits to Iraq by relying on their own means 
and social networks. Th e international refugee regime, 
represented by the UNHCR, has acknowledged the import-
ance of mobility to increase the protection space for Iraqi 
forced migrants in neighbouring countries.43 Th ese policy 
recommendations, however, have yet to be incorporated in 
more eff ective UN-funded assistance programs for the Iraqi 
refugees and returnees from Syria and Jordan.44 In policy 
and practice the three durable solutions of “resettlement to 
a third country,” “local integration in the fi rst country of 
asylum,” and “voluntary repatriation” are still regarded as 
discrete options or stages in a refugee “cycle.”45 Th e gov-
ernments of Western countries of resettlement consider 
the Iraqi asylum seekers who have adopted cross-border 
livelihood strategies less eligible for refugee status. Forced 
migrants’ circular movements reduce their chances to be 
granted resettlement. Th e asylum claims of Iraqi circular 
migrants are dismissed as lacking credibility because it is 
assumed that the real “refugee” is unable to return to Iraq. 
Iraqis’ return movements are interpreted as an indicator 
that the circumstances that caused their displacement no 
longer exist and therefore asylum applicants who engage in 
transnational mobility should not be treated as refugees but 
as normal migrants. In interviews with UNHCR resettle-
ment offi  cers, Iraqi asylum seekers are advised not to pay 
frequent and lengthy visits to Iraq in order to be eligible for 
resettlement.46
Th e individual case management system set up by the 
UNHCR in October 2008 to facilitate the Voluntary Assisted 
Repatriation of Iraqi refugees from Syria and Jordan47 is 
based on the assumption that “returnees” voluntarily re-
establish permanent livelihoods in their country of origin.48 
Accordingly, access to the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation 
assistance is conditioned upon (1) the cancellation of bene-
fi ciaries’ refugee status and the consequent loss of access to 
the associated international protection and assistance and 
(2) the cancellation of benefi ciaries’ residency permit in the 
host country.
Considering that the Iraqi people engage in cross-border 
mobility and livelihood strategies to compensate for the 
insuffi  cient means of subsistence in host countries, and 
considering that they go back to Iraq under conditions of 
persistent insecurity, political instability, and slow progress 
in reconstruction eff orts, the assumptions and conditions 
attached to the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Assistance 
are unrealistic and counterproductive. Instead of supporting 
refugees’ safe and dignifi ed return by protecting their right 
to free movement and their legal status in the host countries, 
the Voluntary Repatriation policies increase migrants’ legal 
vulnerability and restrict their ability to move across bor-
ders and make informed choices about return.
Not surprisingly, between 2007 and 2011 only 4,479 
Iraqi refugees returned facilitated by the UNHCR while 
the estimated number of unassisted returns in the same 
period reached 201,307 individuals.49 Th is raises critical 
questions about dominant understandings and operational 
approaches to refugee return and transnational mobility. 
Is return a sedentary and permanent end-state or a pro-
cess that takes time and entails various degrees and forms 
of transnational mobility and livelihood strategies? Is it 
possible to establish absolute and exclusive distinctions 
between voluntary and involuntary migration? Should the 
refugees accommodate the bureaucratic categories adopted 
by the international refugee regime or should institutional 
approaches be revised to be more responsive to the experi-
ences and needs of forced migrant populations? How do 
national migration and asylum systems interact with inter-
national asylum norms to address the realities of refugee 
and migrant return and transnationalism?
Th e UNHCR and some third-party governments dis-
courage Iraqi asylum seekers’ circular migration between 
Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, since this practice hampers national 
governments’ and international organizations’ ability to 
manage highly mobile displaced communities.50 A growing 
number of Iraqi forced migrants nevertheless disregard the 
institutional requirements and adopt transnational liveli-
hoods as an enduring survival and risk diversifi cation strat-
egy and a way to explore opportunities for the future.
Conclusive Remarks
Th e study of Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan off ers inter-
esting answers to theoretical and empirical questions 
concerning the relationship between refugees’ return and 
transnational migration. Iraqis’ return movements and 
transnational livelihood strategies are not the product of 
international multilateral agreements or of regional legal 
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refugee protection frameworks. Iraqis are returning despite 
the limited national and international attention and insti-
tutional assistance in their support. Not having signed the 
1951 Geneva Convention and having limited resources, the 
Syrian and the Jordanian governments have incorporated 
mobility as a key component of their strategic manage-
ment of the Iraqi protracted displacement. Host author-
ities’ attitudes and migration policies are driven by national 
security concerns and calculations of the impact of forced 
migrants’ long-term presence and cross-border movements 
on the socio-economic developments of the home and host 
societies.
Th e lack of resettlement opportunities and diffi  cult liv-
ing conditions in neighbouring countries infl uence refugees’ 
decision-making processes and migratory plans. Iraqi refu-
gees’ return depends on migrants’ varying degrees of will-
ingness and readiness to interact with the socio-political 
and economic transformations occurring in areas of return. 
Th e legal and socio-economic obstacles faced in Syria and 
Jordan limit the ability of forced migrants to mobilize 
resources before repatriation. Consequently many refugees 
have to rely on pre-existing resources in order to return and 
reintegrate in their home areas. Th e migrants with enough 
fi nancial and material resources optimize life in exile and 
turn it into an opportunity to acquire skills and experience 
that they could employ to facilitate their post-return reinte-
gration and their participation in Iraq’s reconstruction.
Iraqis’ potential and commitment to return and engage 
in developments at home is aff ected by the social, economic, 
and political changes that have occurred in Iraq during 
their absence. Repatriation rarely results in the achieve-
ment of full citizenship rights. Transitional governments 
face great challenges and are seldom able, or willing, to 
grant returning refugees their fundamental rights and free-
doms. Post-war economies and receiving communities have 
limited absorptive capacity to integrate returnees and meet 
their demands for basic services, employment, and develop-
ment opportunities. Th e institutional neglect of the needs 
and aspirations of the Iraqi returnees increases their vul-
nerability and threatens the sustainability of their return 
inducing some to re-migrate.
Refugees’ fl ight, return attempts, and following remi-
grations are integral and interactive phases of the complex 
forced migration experience. Th e protracted wars in Iraq 
caused progressive fragmentation and global dispersion of 
Iraqi families and established transnational linkages and 
practices connecting Iraqi migrants in various countries 
of the world. In the absence of strong family ties in the 
home areas, some Iraqis have low motivations and support 
to re-establish permanent livelihoods in their home com-
munities. Yet they may still wish to return to recoup their 
lost citizenship rights and properties in order to integrate 
them into their transnational livelihoods. Th e international 
refugee regime is concerned with governing the movement 
of refugees aft er repatriation. Stopping returnees’ remigra-
tion, however, may hamper the natural transnational prac-
tices that refugees develop as alternative livelihoods in the 
absence of other, durable solutions.
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